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Human Security in Mali  
 
Section A:  The assignment 
Background 
The context in Mali has changed considerably in the last few years. Progress on poverty 
eradication, growth and democratization was stalled as conflict erupted in 2012 but resumed 
in 2013 and is now slowly getting back on track. A preliminary agreement was signed in 2013 
setting the frame for peace talks that are still on-going with Algeria as chief mediator. In spite 
of these negotiations, violent clashes and attacks by armed groups continue in the northern 
regions of the country.  The post-conflict setting in Mali has created new challenges for the 
Swedish development cooperation portfolio.  
 
Sweden’s development work in Mali is currently guided by the strategy for development 
cooperation with Mali, 2004-2006, prolonged until 2015. This strategy has the overall aim to 
create opportunities for poor women and men to improve their livelihood conditions within 
three main cooperation areas: Pro-poor sustainable growth; Democratic governance and social 
development; and Sustainable development of the natural resource management sectors. A 
draft proposal for a five -year cooperation strategy with Mali has been developed, and is 
under consideration. It includes three main results areas: Democratic governance, gender and 
human rights; Natural resources, environment, climate and resilience; and Human security. 
 
The requested Helpdesk study will be in support of the operationalization of the proposed 
result strategy, in particular the anticipated new Results Area Human security. This Results 
Area may focus on reconciliation and access to justice, but a wide range of possible issue 
areas within Human Security are open to consideration. The proposed strategy further aims to 
explore regional initiatives, as many causes and constraints to building security in Mali are 
regional in nature.  
 
Based on an understanding of present and future trends and issues in the field of human 
security in Mali, the Helpdesk is requested to research and prepare a study of potential areas 
where Sweden could usefully consider developing its support for human security in Mali, 
under the proposed new Human Security Results area. The initial written ToRs for this study 
particularly highlighted issues on reconciliation, access to justice and transitional justice, but 
subsequent guidance from the Swedish embassy in Bamako during a tele-conference clarified 
that the Helpdesk is requested to address the range of potential huamn security options for 
priorities and programmes within the Sweden’s new Human Security Results Area. In this 
context, the study should identify and comment on the capacities and relevance of key 
stakeholders (state actors, private sector actors, international and national NGOs, likeminded 
donors and international organizations) that could be potential cooperation/ implementation 
partners in the upstart and expansion of this new portfolio. Recognising the limitations and 
constraints of a desk-based study by the Helpdesk, the study should aim at least to provide 
suggestions of approaches and organisations by which Sida and the Swedish Embassy may be 
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able to follow-up the potential to support programmes in human security issue areas of 
interest. Examples of human security projects and programmes in similar geopolitical 
contexts, in particular in neighbouring countries in the Sahel, could be referred to if deemed 
relevant for Mali. Finally, it is important that the study includes an analysis of how the 
Human security sector can complement the other sectors in the strategy (as well as ongoing 
contributions /programmes) to build synergies within the overall Swedish development 
cooperation engagement in Mali. 
 
Author: Owen Greene; with inputs from Jens Schjörlien and from a variety of contacts with 
recent Mali field experience  
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Section B: Analysis, Issues and Recommendations 
concerning the development of a new Results Area to 
enhance Human Security in Mali 
 
Introduction 
In Section B, we present our analyses and findings in relation to each of the issues in the 
Terms of Reference for this Helpdesk study. We examine the issues and options for 
developing the Human Security results area in some detail, subject to the constraints of a 
limited, desk-based study. In doing so, we have taken into account a wide range of 
documentation and other information, including the documentation supplied to the Helpdesk 
by the Swedish Embassy in Bamako.  
 
We begin with a brief contextual discussion of the current situation in Mali as it relates to 
Human Security (HS) priorities, and framing the development of a new Human Security 
Results Area in Sweden’s future development co-operation with Mali. In doing so, we assume 
readers’ overall familiarity with the Mali context, drawing for example from the Helpdesk’s 
Report ‘Conflict Analysis Mapping of Mali’  (submitted in August 2014) and the conflict 
analyses included in this mapping,
1
 and also on more recent analyses of the development of 
the Mali Peace Accord and the challenges of development and security building.
2
  
 
The following sub-sections examine in turn potential priority issue areas for developing 
Sweden’s co-operation programmes to promote and improve human security in Mali. This is 
done first in relation to developing relatively self-standing areas of Sweden’s aid support in 
the context of a new Human Security Results Area. Then we examine opportunities for 
developing the human security dimension either in close synergy or as a cross-cutting issues 
with Sweden’s other planned results areas; ‘natural resources, environment, climate and 
resilience’, and ‘democratic governance, gender and human rights’. In each subsection, we 
take into account existing or planned programmes in Mali -  so far as the Helpdesk has 
information about them on the basis of a desk-based study – and discuss the potential for 
Sweden to support or complement these. We also draw on experience with similar 
programmes in other Sahara-Sahel countries and in other regions. The Report concludes with 
some final remarks, including confirmation that we stand ready of request to further clarify or 
elaborate. At the end, we provide a summary of the main suggestions and recommendations 
contained in this Report.  
                                                     
1 Helpdesk of Human Security, Conflict Analyses Mapping of Mali, final revised report August 2014  
2 There are many such analyses - see for example: ICG; Mali: la Paix a marche forcee?, Africa Report No 226, 2 Mai 2015; R. Reeve, Devils 
in the Detail: implementing Mali’s New Peace Accord; Oxford Research Group, March 2015; G. Nyirabikali, Mali Peace Accord: actors, 
issues and their representations, SIPRI, 28 August 2015; G Nyirabikali et al, Causes et Manifestations des Conflits au Mali: une perspective 
de la societe civile; SIPRI 2015. 
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Human Security in Mali: context and scope 
 
The severity and extent of problems of poverty, insecurity and fragility within Mali and 
across its Sahara-Sahel borderlands are well-known: they are intense and complex. They also 
have a long history. The significant progress and positive expectations in at least some sectors 
of Mali development in the 10-15 years after the Peace Accords in the mid-1990s were 
constrained by state fragility and resumption of bad, clientelist, governance. They then 
suffered a severe set-back after the military coup and Tuareg/northern rebellion in 2012, and 
subsequent further large-scale insecurity, population displacements, humanitarian 
emergencies, and stabilisation operations. Recovery programmes have received wide 
international support since 2013, and development programmes have been able to resume in 
parts of the country. Elections have successfully been held.  
 
However, it is only with the signing on 20 June 2015 of the new Mali Peace Accord by the 
Mali Government, the Platform of armed groups (the Platform), and most of the Co-
ordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) that a framework is in place for sustainable peace, 
security and development in Mali. Although some 85% of the Mali population live in the 
South of the country, both experience and analysis show that without progress towards 
inclusive peace and development that addresses needs and aspirations of the peoples in 
Timbouctou, Gao and Kidal regions, Mali will remain profoundly fragile, insecure and poor. 
This is re-inforced by increased political, humanitarian and (in)security linkages between 
central (Mopti and even Segou) and northern Mali during 2014-15.  
 
We are confident that the Swedish government is not only fully aware of these priorities, but 
also is already actively engaged in contributing to addressing them– for example through 
diplomacy and by chairing development sector donor groups concerning northern Mali. 
However, the Peace Accord remains extremely fragile. For example, intense international 
pressure was required to persuade key CMA armed groups to sign the Mali Peace Accord by 
June 2015; levels of commitment to (and shared interpretation of) the Peace Accord are 
uncertain; confidence is low; and the Accord is vague on many key aspects of its 
implementation.
3
   
 
Stabilisation and terrorism prevention challenges are expected (by the Helpdesk, and many 
others) to endure in the medium-long term at least in Kidal, much of Gao, and in the 
borderlands with Algeria and Niger. There is a real risk that Mopti as well as much of 
                                                     
3 Op cit 
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Timbouctou will similarly remain highly insecure, unless local as well as national peace-
building initiatives progress.  
 
In addition to the direct challenges of stabilisation and risks of terrorism, this context implies 
that the tensions between international priorities of short-term stabilisation and counter-
terrorism and support for longer-term peace-building and tackling sources of underlying 
fragility will remain vibrant. This is important, because much of the Malian governing elite 
and southern Malian population appear to remain unconvinced of the need to make major 
concessions to the needs and aspirations of the Northern Malian peoples. Unless the 
international community remains consistently committed to pressing for major reforms to 
address northern peoples’ legitimate concerns, there is a risk that progress towards 
stabilisation and enhanced levels of development aid for Mali will be used by Malian elites 
(including some interested Northern groups) to reproduce the patterns of governance and 
distribution of political-economic benefits that have made Mali so fragile since its 
independence.  
 
Within this overall context, it is clear that there are many human security issues and 
challenges to be addressed in contemporary Mali. This is enhanced by the broad scope of the 
concept of human security. In principle, human security issues in Mali relate to many issues, 
including:  
a) insecurity from violence and coercion associated with not only the wider conflicts that 
the 2015 Mali Peace Accord seeks to address but also with local or regional conflicts 
between or within local or ethnic communities, including cross-border processses and 
transnatioal violent jihadi networksor transnational processes, well as crime, domestic 
violence, and gender-based violence (GBV); 
b) inadequate protection or access to justice from severe abuses of human rights, 
discrimination, illegal expropriation, and injustice, particularly for marginal or 
vulnerable groups – including women, youth, displaced people, and local minorities – 
as well as from risks of violence, injustice and coercion resulting from bad governance 
or inadequate systems for peaceful settlement of disputes; 
c) humanitarian emergency issues,  severe poverty, food and water insecurity, or 
exclusion from critical natural resources or public services. 
 
There are high and widespread problems and needs throughout virtually all of Mali under 
each of the above broad headings. In practice, in the context of wider Swedish and Sida policy 
and programming frameworks – in Mali and globally - we understand that Sweden’s proposed 
new Human Security results area for Mali is not intended to focus directly on addressing the 
third of the above issue areas -humanitarian emergency needs, severe poverty or food or water 
insecurity, or access to, and resilience of, natural resources or most public services. Rather, 
we are requested in this Study to examine the potential and options for Sweden to develop a 
new Results Area for the Mali strategy that addresses selected issues under issue areas a) and 
b) outlined above; including such issues where they relate to the other two expected Results 
Areas (‘natural resources, environment, climate and resilience’ and ‘democratic governance, 
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gender and human rights’). The next sub-sections of this Report therefore explore options on 
possible programming areas within the framework outlined in this sub-section.  
 
Possible Programming Areas within a ‘Human Security’ 
Results Area in Sweden’s forthcoming Five Year 
Development Co-operation Strategy for Mali. 
 
The following sub-sections discuss, in turn, specific areas of possible programme support by 
Sweden within a Human Security results area, within Sweden’s next five year strategy for 
development co-operation with Mali. Each sub-section addresses a selected issue area within 
the scope of Human Security issue clusters a) and b) outlined above – selected accoridng to 
whether, in our assessment, they merit substantial consideration for potential programme 
support by Sweden/Sida in the Mali context over the next five years.   
 
Contributing to Peace Building and Reconciliation  
 
As discussed, the June 2015 Mali Peace Accord provides an important but fragile framework 
for peace-building in Mali. It is important that Sweden, and its international and donor 
partners, provide active support for peace building and associated confidence-building and 
reconciliation processes in Mali. Overall, this requires peace-building work simultaneously at 
all levels: national; across the north, centre and south of the country; within each region and 
district in Mali, within and between communities, and in the borderlands with neighbouring 
Sahara-Sahel countries. In this context, it is preferable that support from Sweden in this issue 
area include support for local as well as national peace-building processes, and includes 
support for peacebuilding in Timbouctou, Gao, and Mopti as well as more readily accessible 
southern regions.   
 
Such peace-building activities and programmes directly address the aspects of human security 
identified under bullet point a) in the previous section, and contribute indirectly to all of the 
other aspects of human security. Sweden’s Human Security Results Area would therefore be 
hard to justify if it did not include support for key aspects of peace-building, confidence-
building and reconciliation.  
 
Moreover, it can build on several existing and recent peace-building programmes for which 
Sweden has provided support, These included not only diplomatic support for the Peace 
Accord negotiation process and Sweden’s contributions to the UN mission, but also, for 
example, support by Sweden and other donors for: SIPRI & CONASCIPAL’s ‘Strengthening 
Civil Society Contributions to Peace, Security and Development in Mali’; Interpeace’s 
‘Inclusive dialogue for the effective implementation of agenda for peace and reconciliation in 
Mali’; contributions to the ‘Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme’; 
Cordaid’s civil society network programme ‘Civil Society for a Human Security Strategy in 
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Mali’; University of Lund studies on conflict and reconstruction in Mali, and aspects of 
relevant UNDP post-conflict recovery programmes.  
 
There are therefore in principle many options for Sweden to consider in relation to support for 
peace-building and associated reconciliation and confidence-building processes. In practice, 
the options are more limited, according to criteria including: availability of capable and 
effective implementing partners; limits on Sweden’s human as well as financial resources for 
support with appropriate oversight and review; the challenges of designing and implementing 
peace-building initiatives that are sustainable and conflict sensitive in the Mali context; and 
ensuring appropriate balance.    
 
We first discuss possible options and approaches to support peacebuilding processes at the 
national level, and then subsequently discuss possible support for local or community-level 
peace-building. As will be discussed, there are probably more opportunities at more local 
levels, but these may pose greater problems in identification, implementing partner selection 
and donor oversight.  
 
Extending and Deepening National Peace-building processes 
The process of further developing and implementing the 2015 Mali Peace Accord at a 
national level is a prime focus for complex international diplomacy and resources. Although it 
is very important, the Helpdesk is not aware of any specific gaps of support for the national 
negotiation process for which Sweden’s development assistance could be needed or 
influential.  
 
However, there certainly continues to be an urgent need to widen engagement in the wider 
national peacebuilding process beyond the Government of Mali and the political/military 
leadership of the armed groups and sub-clans of the Platform and CMA represented at the 
Peace Accord negotiations. In this context, support for civil society groups and for networks 
of informal/traditional authorities, women and youth to contribute to sustainable national 
peace-building  remain important and fully justified.  
 
Similarly, taking into account that international and regional stabilisation and peacebuilding 
missions are likely to continue to be needed in Mali for at least the next five years, it is 
important to consider ways to enhance the extent to which such missions implement UNSC 
1325 principles, and are aware and capable of human security priorities in their training and 
operations. These issues are now briefly discussed below.  
 
Support for Civil Society Networks for National Peace-Building in Mali 
The Helpdesk has reviewed available documentation and outputs relating to some civil 
society national peace-building projects in Mali that have received support from Sweden, 
including those involving SIPRI, Interpeace,  Cordaid, and International Alert. In line with the 
constraints of this short desk-based study with its wider ToRs, this review does not aim to 
provide a well-informed evaluation. Instead we aim simply to raise some issues for 
consideration by Sida/Sweden embassy for future funding in this issue area in Mali. Please 
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note that this subsection focuses on civil society initiatives that are focussed on contributing 
to national peace-building – we discuss initiatives for local peace-building separately below. 
 
All of the above civil society peace-building projects appear to have been designed and 
launched on the well-founded understanding that there is potentially significant public space 
to enable civil society groups and networks in Mali to engage in dialogues and activities 
relating to peace-building and reconciliation. But that they are generally relatively weak and 
fragmented in their capacities and approaches towards peace-building in contemporary Mali.  
Further Swedish support for civil society studies, dialogues, capacity-building and networks 
can help to overcome such limitations and enable significance civil society engagement with 
national peace-building processes – at least in the medium term.  
 
In this context, the development of more inclusive civil society networks is a particular 
priority, in which northern-based civil society groups can dialogue and co-operate with those 
from Bamako and the range of areas across Southern and Central Mali, and thus help to 
contribute to shared understandings and peace-building. 
 
We believe that this rationale is good, and justifies continued support for such civil society 
programmes to support national peace-building and reconciliation capacities in Mali under a 
Human Security results area. However we raise the following issues for consideration by Sida 
as it considers whether and how to support specific proposals. 
 
It is not clear how these civil society peacebuilding network projects aim to connect with, and 
influence, ‘track 1’ discussions and processes for the consolidation and implementation of the 
Mali Peace Accord, the Mali National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR)  and related 
national peace-building processes. Wider experience with civil society peacebuilding 
networks indicates that it can be hard to maintain initial momentum after the formation of 
such networks unless they progress to develop specific foci for collective advocacy or direct 
peace-building engagement.    
 
For example, we have studied SIPRI’s concept note for follow-on project ‘Enabling civil 
society action towards a durable peace in Mali’ (dated 4 March 2015) – provided to us by 
Sida/Embassy. Although we are broadly sympathetic to this draft proposal, it is remarkably 
vague on the foci for supporting direct peacebuilding engagements and other key issues. It 
focuses on developing wider civil society buy-in to the ‘Strategic Vision for Civil Society 
contributions to Peacebuilding in Mali’ that the SIPRI project partners developed during the 
first phase of this project, and providing a platform for discussions around the country on how 
this vision could be operationalised.  Although logical in itself, in a follow-on project we 
would have hoped for more focus, and it risks remaining relatively detached from wider 
national peace-building dialogues, or how civil society-government agency dialogues  and co-
operation  might be nurtured.(We recognise that the proposal may well have been further 
developed by now).  
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The Interpeace/IMRAP follow-on project concept note (‘Phase 2 of Inclusive National 
Dialogue for the effective implementation of the Agenda for peace and reconciliation in Mali, 
dated January 2015) is more developed and specific on such matters, and its objective to 
consolidate a national multi-level permanent ‘architecture’ for peace-building dialogues 
sounds promising, but again it is important to develop clarity on how best to influence 
national level processes. 
 
The justification for supporting civil society research capacities and projects as part of civil 
society peace-building in Mali needs more elaborated focus. Such research projects can aim 
to: be starting points for collaboration to build bridges across civil society divides; provide 
analyses that provide a basis for dialogue; use for advocacy purposes; develop analytical 
capacities to enable civil society networks to better design peace-building initiatives in 
specific contexts, and to ensure that these are conflict sensitive; or better inform external 
actors (such as Government agencies or donors) about contexts or opportunities. However, as 
civil society dialogues or peace-building initiatives begin to mature, it is important to ensure 
clarity about which of these objectives are being addressed. At present, it is not clear which of 
these objectives are important in some of the ‘peace-building’ projects, risking the 
effectiveness of research components.   
 
Joining-up civil society initiatives that are intended to contribute to national peacebuilding. 
Sweden and its partners have supported several promising civil society initiatives to 
contribute to national peace-building, including those mobilised and supported by SIPRI, 
Interpeace and International Alert and their regional and local civil society partners.  If these 
are to develop effective influence in national peace-building processes, including the 
implementation and further development of the 2015 Mali Peace Accord, then they need to be 
encouraged to enhance co-ordination, and agreement on some areas of collaboration, shared 
advocacy goals, or division of labour.  
 
As discussed below, we suggest that the time is ripe for Sweden to complement support for 
national level civil society peacebuilding engagement with more focus on local and 
community level peace-building, in selected areas.  
 
Promoting UNSC 1325 Implementation in Mali 
 
Sweden has an international reputation for promoting implementation of UNSC 1325, and has 
presumably been doing so in relation to MINUSMA and other peace missions in Mali since 
2013. Our main assessment here is that Sweden should assume that such missions will 
continue in Mali for at least the next five years, and thus it make sense to consider ways of 
enhancing human security in Mali by promoting their capacities and roles in protection, 
participation and empowerment of women and girls in the peace-building and reconstruction 
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processes. There is much evidence that this is likely to be particularly needed in the Mali 
context.
4
 
 
There are a range of possible options for doing this, and this desk-based study is not well-
positioned for developing specific proposals.  
 
One option is to support for the further development of awareness and training on UNSC1325 
implementation at the International Peace-Keeping Training Institute in Bamako. This could 
be in the context of wider engagement with this Institute to enhance the quality of training on 
key aspects of peacebuilding, including at community levels, confidence-building, and 
engagement with youth, women, girls and customary authorities.  
 
Another option is particularly to support the engagement of women in national as well as 
local peace-building initiatives within the framework of the civil society peace-building 
initiatives discussed above, including for example in the National Reconciliation Commission 
(CVJR) . We are aware that this is already referenced amongst the objectives of existing civil 
society initiatives that Sweden has supported, but there appears to be scope for further 
development in this area.  
 
National initiatives for transitional justice 
 
There were gross abuses of human rights and humanitarian law perpetrated by all sides of the 
conflicts during 2012-13, and also some subsequently. In this context, there are justifiable 
calls for transitional justice mechanisms. The Helpdesk is sympathetic in principle to such 
calls, but cautious in practice in the present Mali context. The process of implementing and 
further developing the Mali National Peace Accord is likely to remain very fragile, as outlined 
above. In this context, national initiatives for transitional justice should be led by 
development of, and agreements within, the national peace accord process. The Swedish 
embassy is better positioned than the Helpdesk to track local debates about the options in this 
area, and may wish to consult with members of the Mali National Reconciliation Commission 
(CVJR).  
 
However, on the basis of the information available to the Helpdesk, we are cautious about 
recommending that Sweden supports national transitional justice initiatives unless they 
command some acceptance amongst key parties to the Accord. This is not to neglect the issue 
of transitional justice more widely. As discussed below, we recommend that Sweden stands 
ready to support such processes within local or community-level peace-building initiatives, 
where they become important for context specific reconciliation efforts.   
  
Enhancing peace-building training in relevant peace-keeping training institutes 
 
                                                     
4 See for example, the discussion of gender discrimination in Mali in N. Sow and M.Ag Erless, Society and Culture in Mali: problems of 
change, International Alert/Movement Malivaleurs, 2014.  
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This option has already been noted in the context of possible support for the International 
Peace-Keeping Training Institute in Bamako, in the context of UNSC 1235 promotion. But 
there may be scope to enhance human security by improving the training and awareness of 
local and regional military and police units of the opportunities for supporting local and wider 
peace-building in their roles in peace-keeping missions in Mali. Although this is at least a 
medium-term objective, this is appropriate because it is likely that international and regional 
peace missions will continue to be needed in Mali for at least a further five years.  
 
Supporting Local-level Peace-building Processes 
Conflicts and conflict risks are complex, overlapping and serious through much of Mali and 
its borderlands, at all levels: within and between local communities; between sedentary or 
‘indigenous’ and displaced peoples, recent settlers, or pastoralists; between government 
authorities and dissatisfied or competing groups within the South, Centre and North of Mali; 
‘north-south’ tensions; and in relation to transnational and cross-border processes with 
neighbouring states. This implies urgent need for confidence-building, reconciliation and 
peace-building activities at all levels and in almost all localities. It also implies many potential 
opportunities for Sweden to offer support to local peace-building; but also serious challenges 
for donors in terms of selection and oversight of local peace-building initiatives and 
implementing partners.  
 
At local and community levels in Mali, traditional, customary or informal authorities and 
leaders typically play the most important local or community governance and dispute 
management roles and mechanisms.  Engagement of, and with, such authorities is thus likely 
to be vital for sustainable success of reconciliation or peace-building within and between most 
communities. Though its recent support for civil society peace-building initiatives – such as 
the SIPRI project – Sweden has already helped to build the capacity of networks of traditional 
leaders in Mali, and thus has a basis for taking such initiatives further.  
 
However, it is important to avoid idealising such informal authorities, or placing unrealistic 
expectations on their capacities. In context of conflicts, or rapid demographic, developmental 
and societal change, their capacities and legitimacy will be affected, and often challenged or 
undermined. In clientalist states such as Mali, there are usually complex informal 
relationships between customary and state authorities and institutions, which can be highly 
context dependent. Moreover, even in highly fragile states, with weak or dysfunctional formal 
government institutions, experience across a variety of such countries shows that formal state 
institutions and decision-makers usually have more than enough capacity to disrupt or block 
civil society peace-building initiatives with which they are uncomfortable. This implies that 
effective local peace-building requires the development of cooperation between formal and 
informal authorities in the relevant localities, with endorsement (or at least toleration) from 
more senior provincial or traditional leaders.   
 
Community level peace-building also requires wider mobilisation and engagement with other 
types of actors and sectors of society. Skilled national or international NGOs may play key 
facilitating roles. Youth need to be involved, for a variety of reasons, including the youthful 
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demographics of Mali and most other African states, and the risk factors typically associated 
with marginalised or frustrated young men in a context where powerful actors may be 
interested in recruitment into armed groups. Women need to be involved, not only because of 
their potential to contribute to conflict reduction or bridge-building in many contexts, but also 
because reconciliation between traditional male authorities often proves to be unsustainable if 
the women in the community remain unreconciled to the peace. Moreover, from a wider 
human security perspective, it is important that peace-building is an inclusive process rather 
than simply an agreement involving traditional and formal political leaders. Otherwise there is 
a risk not only the peace-building arrangements prove unsustainable but also that large sectors 
of society will not benefit from them as they should.  
 
This approach reflects international best practices, based on lessons-learned as well as 
peaceful inclusive principles. It is this inclusive peace-building approach, that has been 
developed and promoted though the SIPRI, Interpeace and other recent civil society 
peacebuilding supported by Sweden and its partners in Mali since 2013.  However, the 
documentation available to the Helpdesk from these civil society peace-building initiatives 
focusses on the programmes at national or regional civil society network levels, and does not 
provide substantial information on the extent to which these initiatives now provide a good 
basis for local or specific inter-community peacebuilding. They are also unclear about the 
extent to which they have developed good links required for sustainable peacebuilding with 
relevant local state authorities and institutions. 
 
Nevertheless, the Helpdesk is reasonably confident that a review of (geographical and identity 
group) concentrations and local capacities of such existing civil society organisations and 
networks would quickly reveal that there is now a basis for launching initiating peace-
building initiatives  in a number of regions and localities of Mali. Some necessary (though not 
sufficient) criteria for such initiatives include:  
 existence of concentrations of civil society ‘peace-builder’s’ capacity, networks and 
local entry-points involving an appropriate mix of traditional/customary authorities 
and civil society groups/NGOs with strong representation of women and youth within 
the region/locality that cross relevant societal or community ‘conflict’ divisions; 
 Strong potential for developing at least working links and ‘in principle’ endorsement 
for local peace-building initiatives with local state authorities and with relevant 
traditional leaders; 
 Availability of national or international civil society capacity to help to facilitate and 
sustain such a local initiative; including through their good contacts with national 
authorities and with donors.   
The Helpdesk recommends that Sweden encourages its civil society peace-building partners 
to conduct such a review, if they have not already done so, in order to identify whether and 
where the conditions realistically exist to mobilise and sustain one or more local peace-
building initiatives in identified localities. 
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Where possibilities are identified, the Helpdesk recommends that Sweden consider actively 
supporting work to specifically consult with stakeholders and to examine possible approaches 
towards, and phasing of, a peace-building initiative in that area. This should include an 
analysis of the relevant conflict issue and dynamics, and of stakeholder interests and 
concerns. It is important that local and/or inter-community peace initiatives are carefully 
designed and implemented through a consultative approach, in the context of Mali or any 
other conflict affected fragile state.  
 
In this context, it is important to consider the extent to which issues of transitional justice 
should be clearly integrated into any peace-initiatives that receive support from Sweden. In 
the initial ToRs for this study, this issue was highlighted. Our strong recommendation is that 
decisions on this need to be highly context specific. Although reconciliation processes often 
require some form of transitional justice, it is important that the key local stakeholders 
determine the character or phasing of this dimension of peace-building.  
 
So far in this discussion we have deliberately avoided discussing particular geographical 
areas. This depends on the outcome of the review of potential opportunities for local 
peacebuilding initiatives. However, it is important that Sweden aims to develop a relatively 
balanced portfolio of support for local peace-building initiatives, ensuring for example, that 
wider ‘north-south’ balance is apparent.  
 
On the basis of the limited information available to this desk-based study, the Helpdesk 
recommends that efforts are made to identify and develop local inter-community peace-
building initiatives in at least two of the following areas -  Timbouctou, Mopti, Segou and 
Gao – as well as in other areas where opportunities exist (such as Sikasso).   Constructive 
local peace-building initiatives in some of these four regions could have a wider symbolic 
significance for the wider national peace accord process. 
 
We recognise that the Swedish Embassy in Bamako has limited capacity for project 
management and oversight in the areas of peace-building, as for other sectors where it 
provides support. In this context, it is important to identify capable implementing partners to 
co-ordinate and support such local peace-building initiatives.  
 
There are several potential international civil society organisations that are well positioned to 
undertake such work if they are willing to do so. These include SIPRI, InterPeace and 
International Alert and their local civil society partners – and there are other potential 
candidates. After reflection, we recommend that Sweden remains open to the possibility of 
supporting more than one of these types of organisations in such work. It appears to be a 
feature of the various civil society peace-building initiatives in Mali supported by Sweden and 
others since 2013 that they are quite fragmented, and overlap in complex ways. It is likely to 
be more effective for the implementation partners with the best relationships and capacities in 
each of the localities selected to facilitate the relevant local peace-building initiative, than to 
simply select one internaitonal civil society organisaiton in a national competitive tender. 
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In addition to capacities to support and facilitate peace-building initiatives in the selected 
localities, it is important to ensure appropriate links and communications with local and 
national authorities. Local peace-initiatives are not sustainable, or properly legitimate, if they 
do not involve formal authorities in appropriate ways. The Swedish embassy will, in our 
judgement, be needed to facilitate relationship-building between civil society and local and 
national state authorities for such local peace initiatives; at least through diplomatic support 
and accompaniment at key meetings with political or state authorities.   
 
In our early consultations with the Swedish embassy in Bamako, it was suggested that the 
Helpdesk considers the possibility of establishing a local peace-building initiative funding 
mechanism, whereby SIPRI or another civil society implementing partners could manage the 
selection and disbursement of numerous small grants to local civil society groups to support 
local peace-building initiatives. We have done so.  
 
We are supportive in principle of such an approach; but we believe that it requires clearer 
focus, guidelines and facilitation capacity in order to have significant prospect of success. 
Thus, for example, such an approach could be useful as a mechanism to support civil society 
‘next steps’ work to conduct the detailed review, consultations and analysis required to 
develop the basis for launching a local peace-building initiative in a particular area or between 
selected communities in conflict. However, we doubt that this approach would be sufficient to 
effectively support local peace-building initiatives once they are launched. As discussed 
above, these require involvement of key local and national state authorities, and key 
community authorities and leaders, as well as of a full set of civil society groups that are 
committed to peace-building. This is likely to require more active support and facilitation by 
capable international or national implementing partners than a simple funding mechanism 
would imply or provide.  
 
The Helpdesk was requested to include consideration of the role of the private sector in 
human security programming in Mali. Experience shows that local business people (or local 
representatives of national or international enterprises) often have both interest and capacity 
to support and sustain local peace and security initiatives. Where this is the case,  their 
involvement should be encouraged and accepted by Sweden’s implementing partners, as 
implied by the requirements of maintain an inclusive approach. However beyond this, in our 
judgement, approaches towards private sector actors should be very context specific, and not 
particularly singled out or promoted.  
 
Before ending this sub-section we also highlight an alternative approach towards supporting 
local or inter-community peace-building. This is to develop the conflict prevention and peace-
building dimensions of programmes that Sida or others are supporting in relation natural 
resource governance, democratic governance and human rights, or other development aid 
sectors. This option is discussed separately in a sub-section below, and in our view offers 
equally attractive possibilities to specific local peace-building initiatives.  
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Enhancing Access to Justice 
The overall justice sector is in crisis in Mali. In some ways this has been an enduring 
systematic crisis. In addition, programmes prior to 2012 to develop and improve the formal 
justice system which appeared to be making progress before the recent conflict suffered 
severe setbacks during the conflict and up to today. This is the case not only in terms of 
management systems, expert human resources and physical infrastructure but also in terms of 
public reputation and legitimacy. It is particularly the case in the north and centre of the 
country, but applies across the whole country 
 
The relevance of justice systems, and access to justice, to human security is strong. According 
to some understandings of the concept of Human Security, access to affordable and 
adequately fair justice and dispute settlement systems is an intrinsic aspect of the human 
security. If a narrower understanding of the human security concept is adopted, then 
functioning justice systems are important to help to prevent violence, coercion and conflict 
harming individuals and communities. This is partly due to some deterrence effects they may 
provide, but more because such justice systems enable peaceful dispute settlement and help to 
prevent coercive or violent approaches.  Moreover, justice systems provide mechanisms for 
redress against acts of violence, coercion and discrimination, particularly for relatively 
vulnerable or poor sectors of the population.  
 
The support by Sweden for enhancing justice systems, and particularly access to justice, are 
not only fully justifiable within a Human Security Results area in Sweden’s forthcoming 
strategy, but also a priority. We now consider possible approaches for providing such support.  
 
There are several established and recent donor supported justice sector programmes in Mali. 
For example, the European Union is supporting the major ‘Programme d’appui au sectuer de 
la Justice in Mali’ (PAJM)5 , and several donors support the UNDP programme 
for‘Restauration de l‘Autorite de Etat et Access a la Justice au Nord Mali’6. The Helpdesk has 
examined the detail of each of these programmes, on the basis of information provided by the 
Embassy of Sweden and also other publically available information. These are both well-
justified and substantial programmes, which Sweden should consider as candidates for 
funding support as part of its next co-operation strategy for Mali.  
 
However, when considering its options in the justice sector, it is important to recognise the 
limits of such programmes. Both programmes are focussed almost entirely on the 
development and capacity-building of Mali’s formal justice sector. Much of these 
programmes relate to the rehabilitation of court buildings and infrastructure, and to basic  
capacity-building and equipment provision.  
 
In the present Mali context, this is understandable and justifiable according to many criteria, 
including that of state-building. However, it is important to recognise that such programmes 
                                                     
5 As detailed in European Union, ‘Periode de Demarriage du Programme d’appui au Secteur de la Justice au Mali’, Rapport Final, 22 
December 2014, EU & IBF International Consulting.   
6 UNDP, ‘Restauration de l‘Autorite de Etat et Access a la Justice au Nord Mali’, signed January 2014.   
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are likely to have only very limited impact on human security for most of the population. 
Above all this is because most of the population of Mali tend to rely on traditional, customary 
or informal systems for justice and dispute settlement services, and this is particularly the 
case beyond Bamako.  In this, Mali is entirely typical of most states in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly fragile and conflict affected countries. There are many reasons for this, including 
the relative public legitimacy, trust, accessibility, affordability and integrity of traditional or 
customary systems compared to those of the state.  
 
This is not to idealise traditional systems, which can be discriminatory and raise problems for 
due process, and have often been undermined or compromise by conflict, clientelist patronage 
and (in some contexts) by criminal networks – as outlined above. Moreover, experience in 
similar contexts (the Helpdesk is not aware of specific studies for Mali)  indicates that 
customary justice systems tend to be much better at providing effective justice and dispute 
settlement services within their relevant communities than for inter-communal disputes.   
 
But it does reflect the fact that the formal justice system in Mali has profound weaknesses and 
problems that are unlikely to be more than partially addressed for the foreseeable future 
through donor-supported programmes such as PAJM or and the UNDP programme to 
rehabilitate the state justice system in the North.  
 
Surveys of poor and vulnerable people’s preferences and priorities in the justice (and security) 
sector in contexts similar to Mali indicate that, although traditional and customary systems of 
justice are most widely used and trusted, such people also support enhanced presence of 
formal justice services. Above all, they want enhanced choice of accessible justice and 
dispute settlement systems, and improved mutual recognition or co-ordination between the 
various formal and informal justice mechanisms that are available. For example, women 
might prefer to approach traditional justice systems to address crimes of violence or theft, but 
often prefer to have the option of going to formal/state justice systems on issues where 
societal gender discrimination means that they are unlikely to receive justice through 
traditional authorities (such as inheritance, property dispute or domestic violence). They also 
tend to recognise that state political or justice authorities  can play important facilitation or 
adjudication roles where more than one traditional justice system or authority needs to be 
involved.  
 
We therefore recommend that Sweden focus on supporting measures that have a more 
realistic prospect of enhancing access to justice by ordinary people than do programmes 
entirely focussed on capacity-building and reform of the formal state justice system in Mali. 
These could include the following: 
 Support programmes to enhance co-ordination and mutual recognition between formal 
and informal or customary justice systems. This could include support for national-
level initiatives to better enable such co-ordination and/or provincial or district level 
initiatives in selected areas.  
 Support programmes to enhance access to the local formal justice system by 
vulnerable sectors of the community in selected geographical areas (i.e. localities 
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where the formal justice system has a presence and shows and interest in enhancing 
access to justice), for example through the development of basic legal aid facilities; 
development of local ‘community’ courts in which customary authorities have some 
representation; development of special local courts designed to enable access to justice 
for women. 
 Support programmes to develop formally recognised dispute settlement systems on 
particular issues for which there is high demand (for example, land boundary disputes, 
or disputes relating to access to or ownership of water, land or forest resources). 
Within the resource and access constraints of this desk-based Helpdesk study, we have not 
been able to identify specific initiatives and implementing partners to follow-up on the above 
suggestions.   One starting point for such follow-up might be the programme implementers 
for the PAJM, UNDP and other formal justice system programmes, to explore potential for 
complementary or linked programmes in the above areas in certain districts. Another starting 
point might be Sweden’s implementing partners for its programmes concerned with climate 
change resilience, natural resource governance or democratic governance programmes, 
through which district or provincial level opportunities might at least be initially identified.  
 
By the general criterion of enhancing human security through access to justice and peaceful 
dispute settlement, then programmes would be justified in virtually all parts of Mali. In terms 
of resilience against violence or wider conflict, perhaps programmes in the north and centre of 
the country (e.g Mopti, Timbouktou and Gao) may be considered most positively.  
Finally, there are important potential links in this area with elements of the Danish Regional 
Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Initiative; for example those concerned with the protection of 
pastoralist and local border communities.
7
  
 
Security Sector Reform 
 
Security and justice sector reform are recognised as particular priorities in contemporary 
Mali. This relates to almost every element of the security sector, including police, army, 
border and customs systems, and democratic governance and oversight mechanisms. The 
primary motivations for donor support since 2013 have been to contribute to stabilisation, and 
longer term peace-building and state-building, and in that context also to enhanced 
democratic control, governance and accountability of the security sector.  These are linked in 
complex ways with counter-terrorism programmes in the north and centre of the country.  
 
Prominent programmes to support SSR in Mali include MINUSMA programmes, including 
police capacity building, and the EU Training Mission to capacity-build (and to some extent 
reform) the Malian Armed Forces. As part of the Danish Regional Sahel Peace and 
Stabilisation Programme, there is support for an on-going detailed and comprehensive 
security sector analysis, and for strengthening democratic oversight and governance of the 
                                                     
7 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Initiative 2013-17 (Oct 2013), as discussed particularly 
in section 5.3 (pp28-30).  
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police, arms and other key security sector agencies – in which DCAF (the Geneva Centre for 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces) is playing a leading role. UNODC leads a substantial 
programme to develop the regulatory and legal capacities, as well as information exchange 
systems, to address transnational trafficking and criminal networks.  
 
There are profound challenges, and problems, concerning security sector reform in Mali. 
Since 2013, these have included tensions between SSR programmes focussed on enhancing 
the capacity, presence and effectiveness of the army and police, and their control by the 
Bamako – based Mali government – on the one hand, and profound reform of the security 
sector as it relates to the north of Mali as part of a sustainable national peace process on the 
other. The recent Mali peace accord includes provision for the recognition and potential 
integration into the formal Mali security sector of ‘legitimate’ northern community security 
groups. But the design and implementation of this aspect of the Acord is likely to be a central 
and complex challenge in the context of wider implementation of the Accord.  
 
All of the above SSR programing areas are relevant to enhancing human security in Mali. 
Thus Sweden may consider contributing support to some of these existing programmes.  This 
includes those of the Danish Initiative framework, where there may for example be 
opportunities for Sweden to extend of deepen the programme on enhancing democratic 
governance of the security sector, or to further develop SSR agendas to address the particular 
needs of women and girls).  
 
We particularly recommend that Sweden focusses on considering opportunities to support 
community safety and security initiatives in selected parts of Mali. Community Safety and 
Security programmes are particularly focussed on supporting efforts to address the security 
and justice needs of communities, and thus adopt a relatively ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
security sector reform. Thus capacity-building and reform of legitimate providers of local 
policing services is certainly included within this framework, including ‘community policing’ 
initiatives. However such support would not necessarily be limited to the formal policing 
institutions but also to other institutions and resources that provide policing services which 
are regarded to have a legitimate role by the relevant local communities. Moreover, 
community safety and security initiatives aim to develop trust and co-operation between all 
sections of the community and policing (and justice providers), and in this context ensuring 
the such providers respond to the needs and priorities of vulnerable sectors of the local 
population, including minorities, women, girls and youth.   
 
The Helpdesk aimed to identify possible implementing partners for community safety and 
security programming in Mali, within the constraints of this desk-based study; using our 
contacts in the country. These enquiries had limited results, but confirmed that possibilities 
for initiatives and programmes in this area are already widely recognised and discussed. There 
are several international CSOs with relevant experience that are – reportedly – actively 
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seeking support for such programmes.
8
 However, within the constraints of this assignment, 
the Helpdesk is not been able to obtain confirmed details of such programmes. We 
recommend that the Swedish Embassy in Bamako follow-up on this issue, to clarify options 
and opportunities for providing support this issue area as part of the Human Security 
component of the next five year strategy.   
 
In terms of geographical priorities for such community security programmes, it would be 
particularly beneficial in terms of wider national peace-building and resilience against 
violence if good programmes could be identified and supported in Timbouctou, Gao and 
Mopti regions, and also in relatively insecure border regions. For example, there may be 
opportunities of enhancing police and justice rehabilitation programmes or specific 
community initiatives associated with access to justice or local peace-building initiatives (as 
discussed above).  
 
Similarly, there may be possibilities of enhancing community security dimensions of the 
border areas initiatives for protection of pastoralists and local communities within the Danish 
Regional Initiative framework. However, these are simply preferences. Further investigations 
may identify better opportunities in other areas of Mali.   
 
SALW control and armed violence reduction 
 
Wide availability and inadequately controlled stock and flows of small arms and light 
weapons are widely recognised to be a major human security concern in and around Mali. 
Availability of large stocks of SALW flowing from Libya, together with mobile armed 
groups, is recognised as a major factor in the conflicts in Mali during 2012-13, and on-going 
insecurity in the North of Mali. Moreover, the wide availability of SALW is a major source of 
human insecurity in most parts of Mali. Although these weapons do not in themselves cause 
conflict and crime, they do greatly contribute to the risks of escalation of conflict and 
violence, and to the impacts of violence. Use of SALW greatly increases the lethality and 
impacts of armed violence, and intimidates vulnerable communities in relation to exploitation 
or expropriation. 
 
Moreover, enhanced controls or reduction of SALW can be important symbols or entry points 
for peace-building in fragile or conflict affected contexts. The ’Flames de la Paix’ of the late 
1990s in Mali proved to be powerful confidence-building measures between Tuareg and 
southern Mali communities and authorities. In many other similar contexts around the world, 
voluntary weapons hand-in or destruction programmes continue to provide important focal 
points for local community mobilisation to enhance security and peace.  
 
                                                     
8 For example, a well-informed international source in Mali stated in relation to Community Security and Safety programmes in Mali: "what 
I hear is that it's an overcrowded place, with everyone trying to work there and the Malian authorities struggling to keep up after being used 
to years of international indifference. I've only been in touch with DCA, HI and DDG, but it seems everyone is there, so donors have many 
options to pick from...”  
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In this context, we recommend that Sweden seriously considers supporting programmes to 
reduce or control SALW stocks, availability and mis-use as important elements of its Human 
security results area in its new Mali strategy. In fact, there is a strong basis in place for 
Sweden to rapidly develop its programmes in this issue area in Mali. Mali has relatively 
strong national SALW reduction and control policies as part of wider ECOWAS and AU 
SALW agreements. Moreover, it has a National Action Plan in place for the reduction and 
control of SALW, and a well-established and active National Commission against the 
Proliferation of SALW in Mali (CNLPAL). CNLPAL is tasked with co-ordinating and 
promoting  implementation of this national action plan, and also facilitaing its further 
development.  
 
There are many different types of programme that can contribute to SALW reduction and 
control. In practice, many of the existing donor supported SALW programmes in Mali focus 
in the area of ‘Physical Security and Stockpile Management’ (PSSM) of authorised SALW 
holdings. This includes providing or enhancing secure storage racks, buildings and overall 
facilities for storing police, army and other legitimate holdings of SALW and associated 
ammunition; and developing systems of marking, record keeping and inventory control – not 
least so that losses from authorised stock can rapidly be identified and investigated, and 
sources of diversion closed down. The AU, ECOWAS and UNREC are amongst the 
important regional organisations that are actively promoting such PSSM programmes in Mali 
and its neighbouring countries. Germany, USA (State Dept) and other donors are supporting 
CSOs including Handicap International,  Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), 
Mine Action Group (MAG) and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) to implement such  
PSSM programmes in Mali.  
 
This PSSM activity and donor support is welcome and valuable, but its limited scope is 
problematic and implies that there are some important gaps in SALW-related programming 
that Sweden could usefully help to address. Even within the terms of the PSSM agenda, much 
of the current SALW control programming is limited to technical measures (rehabilitation of 
buildings, provision of arms marking machines, etc). For example, experience in many similar 
contexts shows that there is a big difference between installing SALW physical security and 
stockpile monitoring capacities and the wider human and institutional engagement and 
reforms that are needed for these capacities to be used properly. The human and institutional 
factors are particularly important for ensuring the SALW and ammunition is not regularly 
lost, stolen or corruptly sold from military, police or other major legal stockpiles in Mali and 
the wider Sahel; and thus for actually contributing to human security.    
 
In this context, Sweden could consider supporting programmes that build-upon or 
complement recent or current SALW PSSM programmes which are focussed on the wider 
training and institutional reforms of the relevant policing, military of other institutions that 
hold weapons stocks. This would be widely recognised as an important contribution.  
In some respects such programming would be a combination of SALW and SSR 
programming, since it would focus on the reform of those parts of the police and security 
agencies that are responsible for stockpile management and control (and destruction). It is 
23 
 
further important to note that this could be integrated with the types of community safety and 
security programmes discussed above. Improved controls on holdings of SALW and 
ammunition by local police and others that provide security services (including tolerated 
armed groups) has proved to be an important element of such  programmes in some other 
country contexts, and can indeed be a useful entry point to wider confidence-building and 
community-police relationship building.  
 
However, there is also important scope for supporting wider efforts to enhance SALW 
destruction and control. Voluntary weapons hand-in or similar confidence and security-
building measures can, for example, become important aspects of local peace-building 
initiatives. Although they would be embedded within such a local peace-building initiatives, 
such elements would require expert support from appropriately-skilled SALW programme 
specialists as well as collaboration by the formal police.  
 
If Sweden is interested in further exploring such possibilities, then there are several 
institutions and organisations based in Mali and in Europe with which to consult. Most 
importantly, it would be important to consult with the Executive Director of Mali’s National 
Commission on SALW (i.e.CNLPAL). It is active and relatively capable, and well embedded 
with relevant Mali government ministries and Mali CSOs. Moreover, its Executive Director is 
sometimes frustrated that donors do not sufficiently consult with it.
9
  
 
In addition, international CSOs with specialist expertise on such SALW programmes are 
active in Mali – as discussed above – and organisations such as BICC, MAG and the Small 
Arms Survey can be expected to be very willing to act as consultation partners, if not 
implementing partners, for such activities.  
 
Finally, it is important to recognise that there are, or should be, close linkages between SALW 
and armed violence reduction measures in the Mali context. For example, reducing the ready 
availability of SALW within homes or communities can help to reduce the lethality of GBV. 
There is substantial experience in other contexts with developing community safety and 
security programmes that are not explicitly focussed on the security of women and girls but 
which are designed to enable women’s security issues to be better recognised and addressed at 
local levels, and in this context to develop mechanisms to reduce their vulnerability to GBV. 
The Helpdesk has not been able to identify specific programmes or implementing partners in 
Mali in this particular respect, but the civil society networks which Sweden has supported in 
relation to peace-building networks should be able to provide entry points – as indeed will 
implementing partners for Sweden’s previous strategy where it relates to gender.  
 
 
                                                     
9 Personal Communication from Executive Director of the National Commission: Dr Brigadier-General Mme Kani Coulibaly. 
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Human Security: Possible Synergies with Other Results 
Areas for Sweden’s new Strategy.  
 
Sweden has a substantial track record and experiences with development co-operation and 
support in Mali on the themes: pro-poor sustainable growth; sustainable development of 
natural resource management sectors, and democratic governance and social development. 
Moreover, the two main results areas in addition to ‘human security’ proposed for Sweden’s 
next strategy for Mali are: ‘natural resources, environment, climate and resilience’, and 
democratic governance, gender and human rights’. In broad terms there are intrinsic overlaps 
and synergies between these two other Results Areas and ‘human security’. In this subsection 
we highlight and discuss some specific ways in which synergies could be developed between 
the human security and other Results Areas for the new Strategy, and where there is potential 
for cross cutting programmes. 
 
Enhancing human security as an element of natural resource governance programmes  
Conflict and disputes relating to water, land or forestry access and rights are widespread in 
Mali. This includes competition for natural resources within the relatively densely populated 
areas of the inland Niger Delta (Mopti, Timbouctou, and Gao areas) and borderland areas of 
Sikasso with Burkina Faso. It also includes widespread tensions between pastoralist 
communities and between pastoralist and sedentary communities across much of Mali and its 
borderlands.  
 
A key aspect of enhancing natural resource governance in Mali is to support the development 
of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms in relation to natural resource tenure and use.  This 
can also make a major contribution to human security from violence, coercion or 
expropriation.  
 
We therefore recommend that Sweden actively explores possibilities of supporting the wider 
development and equitable use of peaceful dispute settlement systems in localities and regions 
in Mali where it also has supported (or plans to support) natural resource governance and 
sustainable use. The issues and frameworks for supporting such access to justice and dispute 
settlement mechanisms were discussed in relation to Human security in a previous sub-
section. There is also potential to support the development and operation of relatively 
customised dispute settlement and access to justice mechanisms for key issues relating to 
natural resource governance: such as land tenure, water use, boundary or inheritance disputes. 
Similarly, there are issues of particular concern to women in this context, whose property or 
inheritance rights are often particularly vulnerable. Mechanisms to address such problems 
could preferentially be developed, for wider access by all sectors of the community but in an 
area of special interest to women. 
 
One way of approaching this is to aim to co-locate Swedish support for the proposed human 
security programmes to enhance access to justice (as discussed above) with it natural resource 
governance programmes. This would be a way of enhancing synergies.  
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An alternative framework would be to provide enhanced support for natural source 
governance programmes in Mali in ways that not only enhance and ensure their conflict 
sensitivity but also include specific support for local peace-building or dispute settlement 
mechanisms. These would then become cross-cutting programmes combining human security 
with natural resource governance mechanisms. 
 
More broadly, this provides a framework for Sweden to co-operate with programmes 
supported by other donors in this sector in ways that enhances their human security impacts. 
The Helpdesk has reviewed several of the numerous programmes in Mali supported by other 
donors relating to natural resource use and governance, and associated sustainable agriculture 
programmes. This has confirmed that there are many opportunities for Sweden to adopt this 
approach, though it is not possible for us on the basis of available information to prioritise 
amongst these possible partners. But, for example, the Danish Regional Sahel Peace and 
Stabilisation programme appears to provide a well designed and developed framework for 
such co-operation in borderland areas. For example, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue’s 
work to manage risks of pastoralist conflicts during times of drought or associated with major 
herd migration, supprtied as part of the Danish regional programme, might usefully provide a 
stimulating example and entry point.   
 
Climate Change and Resilience  
Similar observations apply to possible support for programmes to enhance resilience against 
the impacts of climate change. 
 
‘Resilience’ is a complex and rich concept. In practice the resilience of a society to natural 
disasters, climate change, or other ‘external’ shocks depends greatly of its conflict resilience – 
that is its capacity to negotiate and develop responses to crises peacefully, and to manage and 
resolve tensions with recourse to violence. In this context, any programmes that Sweden 
chooses to support to enhance resilience against climate change could usefully include a 
substantial component to strengthen dispute settlement and confidence-building measures in 
the relevant communities.  
 
It is also important to recognise that some national government and donor-supported 
programmes in the wider Sahel region which are intended to enhance resilience against 
climate change in fact risk being highly conflict insensitive. These include programmes to 
reduce reliance on rain-fed agriculture through irrigation or ground-water exploitation 
schemes. Sweden should not only ensure that the programmes to which it provides support in 
this sector are conflict sensitive, but also support wider awareness raising on this issue in the 
Mali government and amongst other donors.  
 
 
Synergies with Democratic Governance, gender and human rights results area 
There are wide opportunities for synergies between this results area and human security – in 
many ways too wide to discuss with any specificity. For example, we note that in 2015, a key 
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objective of Sweden’s operational area in Mali in relation to democratic governance are 
‘issues relating to access by women and girls to power, security and opportunity’.10  In this 
context, all of the Human Security programming possibilities discussed above are relevant 
also to this Results Area, including promoting UNSC 1325 implementation; inclusive local 
peace-building initiatives; access to justice for vulnerable sector of the community, 
community safety and security programmes, and violence (including GBV) reduction 
programmes.  
 
Similarly, as the stabilisation and peace-building process in Mali progresses, inclusive and  
conflict sensitive governance at a regional or district level becomes increasingly important. If 
this implies that Sweden prioritises support for good local governance beyond Bamako, then 
this could link importantly with the local peace-building initiatives discussed above in relation 
to Human Security.  
 
 
Final Remarks 
In this Helpdesk Report, we have clarified and discussed a range of feasible and important 
approaches and sectors by which Sweden could significantly contribute to human security in 
Mali in the proposed human security Results Area in Sweden next Strategy for Co-operation 
with Mali.  
 
If resources and Sida/Embassy staff capacities are sufficient, we recommend that Sweden’s 
new Results Area should aim to support programmes in most of the main issues areas 
identified in this report. This need not result in fragmentation or dispersal of effort and 
impact. There appears, for example, to be significant potential for combining support for local 
peace-building, access to justice, and community security initiatives in some areas. We 
believe that there is strong potential not only for specific human security programmes but also 
for developing the human security dimension in relation to natural resource governance and 
democratic governance, gender and human rights programmes.  
 
Moreover, it is important in terms of the overall profile of Sweden’s support for human 
security that it includes substantial support for human security in districts in the centre and 
north of the country as well as nationally and in the South. But this, of course, is a matter for 
Sida and the Swedish embassy.  
 
In each of the potential areas for Human security programming that we have discussed, we 
have aimed to identify where programming experience exists in similar contexts in other 
countries which would usefully inform the development of Sweden’s portfolio of human 
security programmes in Mali. However, in each such sector or issue area, experience in other 
contexts is rich and complex, and the time and space constraints of this Report have not 
allowed us to go into detail. However, as Sida and the Swedish Embassy in Bamako begin to 
                                                     
10 Sida, Annual Plan for the Implementation of Swedish Development Co-operation with Mali 2015, (Sida 2014), page 2.  
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develop and establish priorities for Sweden’s portfolio of human security programmes, the 
Helpdesk would be pleased to further elaborate on lessons or examples from wider 
experience.  
 
Similarly, as outlined in the introduction, we have not only assumed detailed knowledge and 
experience with the context in contemporary Mali, with the conflict-related analyses that we 
summarised and mapped in a previous Helpdesk assignment (Helpdesk, Conflict Analyses 
Mapping of Mali, final report August 2014), and also with the recent development and 
debates surrounding the establishment of the Mali Peace Accord in June 2015. In doing so 
there is a risk that we have insufficiently specified our analysis of the wider context and 
possibilities in Mali and the Sahel, and thus the basis for our explicit or implicit 
recommendations for Sweden to promote human security may not always be clear. We 
similarly stand ready to clarify these, on request.  
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Summary of main recommendations 
 
On the basis of our analysis of the human security context and priorities in Mali, this Report 
identifies a number of specific issue areas that are directly relevant to enhancing human 
security in contemporary Mali, and develops suggestions and proposals for programme 
support under the new Human Security results Area to which we recommend that Sida and 
the Swedish embassy devote particular attention. In this final sub-section we briefly 
summarise our main recommendations and suggestions in each area, for ease of reference. As 
noted on the ’Final Remarks’ section above, we recommend that Sweden aims to develop a 
portfolio of programme support across a number of these selected issue area, rather then 
simply select one or two.  
 
Selected Potential Programming Areas within a ‘Human Security’ 
Results Area for Mali. 
 
Contributing to Peace Building and Reconciliation  
The June 2015 Mali Peace Accord provides an important but fragile framework for peace-
building in Mali. Support for Peace-building from Sweden over the next five year should 
include support for local as well as national peace-building processes, and include support for 
peacebuilding in Timbouctou, Gao, and Mopti as well as more readily accessible southern 
regions.   
 
Extending and Deepening National Peace-building processes 
The Helpdesk is not aware of any specific gaps of support for the national negotiation process 
to implement and develop the Mali Peace Accord for which Sweden’s development assistance 
could be needed or influential. However, there is an urgent need to widen engagement in the 
wider national peacebuilding process to enable civil society groups and networks of 
informal/traditional authorities, women and youth to contribute to sustainable national peace-
building (as well as local, see below).  
 
Support for Civil Society Networks for National Peace-Building in Mali: Continued 
Swedish support for civil society studies, dialogues, capacity-building and inclusive national 
networks for national peace-building is well-justified. However when considering specific 
proposals, we recommend that Sweden strongly encourages these civil society peacebuilding 
network projects to more directly connect with, and influence, ‘track 1’ discussions and 
processes for the consolidation and implementation of the Mali Peace Accord, the Mali 
National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR)  and related national peace-building processes. 
In this context, for example, further support for civil society research capacities and projects 
as part of civil society peace-building in Mali should be conditional on them developing 
greater focus and clarity on their objectives in influencing or enhancing the national peace-
building process.  Morever, it is important to enhance co-ordination between the several civil 
29 
 
society peace-building networks and programmes, including agreements on some areas of 
collaboration, shared advocacy goals, and divisions of labour.  
 
Promoting UNSC 1325 Implementation in Mali: Sweden should continue to promote 
implementation of UNSC 1325 in Mali, on the realistic assumption that MINUSMA and/or 
other international peace missions in Mali will continue for at least the next five years. 
Amongst various options are: support for the further development of awareness and training 
on UNSC1325 implementation at the International Peace-Keeping Training Institute in 
Bamako; and to support the engagement of women in national as well as local peace-building 
initiatives within the framework of the civil society peace-building initiatives discussed 
above, including for example in the National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) .  
 
National initiatives for transitional justice: There are justifiable calls for national transitional 
justice mechanisms. The Helpdesk is sympathetic in principle to such calls, but cautious in 
practice in the present Mali context. In the context of the fragility of Mali National Peace 
Accord, we recommend caution on supporting national transitional justice initiatives unless 
they command some acceptance amongst key parties to the Accord.  
 
Enhancing peace-building training in relevant peace-keeping training institutes: we 
suggest that Sweden considers the possibility of supporting the International Peace-Keeping 
Training Institute in Bamako, not only for UNSC 1235 promotion, but also to improve and 
extent the training and awareness of local and regional military and police units of the 
opportunities for supporting local and wider peace-building in their roles in peace-keeping 
missions in Mali.  
 
Supporting Local-level Peace-building Processes 
There is urgent need for confidence-building, reconciliation and peace-building activities at 
all levels in Mali, and in most localities. There are important potential opportunities for 
Sweden to offer support to local peace-building initiatives and processes, which merit overall 
prioritisation in the portfolio for this new Human Security Results Area.  
 
Sweden has already established a basis for substantially developing its support for 
community-level peace-building processes in selected localities Effective community level 
peace-building initiatves need to be inclusive, properly involving relevant traditionand and 
customary leaders and mechanisms, representatives and networks of youth, women, and 
locally marginalised as well as majority groups. Sweden’s recent support for national civil 
society peace-building initiatives has already helped to build the capacity of such networks, 
and links with capable international NGOs which can play key facilitating roles to support 
local peace-building initiatives..  
 
Encourage, and provide support for,  Sweden’s civil society national peace-building 
partners to conduct a review, if they have not already done so, in order to identify whether 
and where the conditions realistically exist to mobilise and sustain one or more inclusive 
local peace-building initiatives in identified localities. The Helpdesk is reasonably confident 
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that a review of (geographical and identity group) concentrations and local capacities of such 
existing civil society organisations and networks would quickly reveal that there is now a 
basis for launching initiating peace-building initiatives  in a number of regions and localities 
of Mali.  
 
Where this initial review identifies that conditions appear to exist for supporting effective 
local peace-building initiatves, we recommend that Sweden consider actively supporting 
detailed work to specifically consult with stakeholders and to examine possible approaches 
towards, and phasing of, a peace-building initiative in such areas, including analysis of the 
relevant local peace and conflict issues and dynamics, and of stakeholder interests and 
concerns. It is important that such local initiatives are carefully designed and implemented 
through a consultative local approach. In this context, possible support for transitional justice 
initiatives as an integral element of such local peace-initiatives should be considered, but 
decisions on this need to be highly context specific.  
 
A relatively balanced portfolio of support for local peace-building initiatives needs to be 
developed in order to help ensure conflict sensitivity, ensuring for example, that wider 
‘north-south’ balance is apparent. We recommend that efforts are made to identify and 
develop local inter-community peace-building initiatives in at least two of the following areas 
-  Timbouctou, Mopti, Segou and Gao – as well as in other areas where opportunities exist 
(such as Sikasso).   The Swedish embassy will, in our judgement, be further needed to 
facilitate relationship building between civil society and local and national state authorities for 
such local peace initiatives; at least through diplomatic support and accompaniment at key 
meetings with political or state authorities 
 
There are several potential international civil society organisations that are well positioned 
to support and facilitate such local peace-building activites with Sweden’s support. After 
reflection, we recommend that Sweden remains open to the possibility of supporting more 
than one of these types of organisations in such work, rather than focussing on one specific 
tender.  
 
On the possibility that Sweden might establish a local peace-building initiative funding 
mechanism, we find that this could be useful for certain purposes, for example as a 
mechanism to support civil society ‘next steps’ work to conduct the detailed review, 
consultations and analysis required to develop the basis for launching a local peace-building 
initiative in a particular area or between selected communities in conflict. However, we doubt 
that this approach would be sufficient to effectively support local peace-building initiatives 
once they are launched.  
 
On the issue of whether and how to promote private sector engagement in local peace-
building initiatives, Sweden should always encourage an inclusive approach. Local 
businesses can sometimes play an important role. However, beyond this, approaches towards 
private sector actors should be very context specific, and not particularly singled out or 
promoted.  
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Enhancing Access to Justice 
 
Support for enhancing justice systems, and particularly access to justice, should be considered 
to be a priority within a new Human Security Results Area. We now consider possible 
approaches for providing such support.  
 
There are several established and recent donor supported justice sector programmes in Mali, 
inlcuding the European Union supported ‘Programme d’appui au sectuer de la Justice in Mali’ 
(PAJM)
11
 , and UNDP programme for‘Restauration de l‘Autorite de Etat et Access a la 
Justice au Nord Mali’12. These are both well-justified and substantial programmes, to which 
Sweden could usefully consider contributing.  However, when considering options in the 
justice sector, it is important to recognise the limits of such programmes. Both programmes 
are focussed almost entirely on the development and capacity-building of Mali’s formal 
justice sector. They thus help to contribute to state-building, but are likely to have only very 
limited impact on access to justice for most of the population.  
 
Sweden could usefully particularly focus on supporting programmes that realistically 
promote local access to justice. Although most of the population of Mali is likely to continue 
to rely on traditional, customary or informal systems for justice and dispute settlement 
services, evidence indicates tht poor and vulnerable people also support enhanced local 
presence of fair and accessbile formal justice services. In this context, we recommend that 
Sweden focusses on supporting programmes to:  
 enhance co-ordination and mutual recognition between formal and informal or 
customary justice systems. This could include support for national-level initiatives to 
better enable such co-ordination and/or provincial or district level initiatives in 
selected areas.  
 enhance access to the local formal justice system by vulnerable sectors of the 
community in selected geographical areas (i.e. localities where the formal justice 
system has a presence and shows and interest in enhancing access to justice), for 
example through the development of basic legal aid facilities; development of local 
‘community’ courts in which customary authorities have some representation; 
development of special local courts designed to enable access to justice for women. 
 develop formally recognised dispute settlement systems on particular issues for 
which there is high demand (for example, land boundary disputes, or disputes relating 
to access to or ownership of water, land or forest resources). 
Security Sector Reform 
Security and justice sector reform (SSR) are recognised as particular priorities in 
contemporary Mali, for human security as well as for statebuilding and peacebuilding. Several 
existing programmes to support SSR, including those of the Danish Initiative framework, are 
                                                     
11 As detailed in European Union, ‘Periode de demarriage du Programme d’appui au Sectuer de la Justice au Mali’, Rapport Final, 22 
December 2014, EU & IBF International Consulting.   
12 UNDP, ‘Restauration de l‘Autorite de Etat et Access a la Justice au Nord Mali’, signed January 2014.   
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worthy of support – for example to extend or deepen the programme on enhancing democratic 
governance of the security sector, or to further develop SSR agendas to address the particular 
needs of women and girls.  
 
We recommend that Sweden focusses on considering opportunities to support community 
safety and security initiatives in selected parts of Mali. The Helpdesk has been able to 
confirmed that possibilities for initiatives and programmes in this area are already widely 
recognised and discussed, and there are several international CSOs with relevant experience 
that are – reportedly – actively seeking support for such programmes. In this Report we have 
identified a range of options for such programmes, but developing specific recommendations 
would require in-country investigation, which we recommend that Sweden undertakes. 
For a number of reasons, it would be particualrly desirable to support such programmes in 
Timbouctou, Gao and Mopti regions, and also in relatively insecure border regions.  
 
SALW control and armed violence reduction 
 
We recommend that Sweden seriously considers supporting programmes to reduce or 
control Small Arms and Light Weapons (and ammunition) stocks, availability and mis-use 
as important elements of its Human security results area. There is moreover a strong basis 
in place for Sweden to rapidly develop its programmes in this issue area in Mali. Mali has 
relatively strong National Action Plan in place for the reduction and control of SALW, and a 
well-established and active Mali National Commission against the Proliferation of SALW in 
Mali (CNLPAL).  
 
Many of the existing donor supported SALW programmes in Mali focus in the area 
of‘Physical Security and Stockpile Management’ (PSSM) of authorised SALW holdings. This 
PSSM activity and donor support is valuable, but its limited scope is problematic and implies 
that there are some important gaps in SALW-related programming that Sweden could usefully 
help to address. Sweden could consider supporting programmes that build-upon or 
complement existing SALW PSSM programmes which are focussed on the wider training 
and institutional reforms of the relevant policing, military of other institutions that hold 
weapons stocks. This could be integrated with the types of community safety and security 
programmes recommended above, and also be seen as a combination of SALW and SSR 
programming, since it would focus on the reform of those parts of the police and security 
agencies that are responsible for stockpile management and control (and destruction).  
 
We further recommend that Sweden considers support for wider efforts to enhance SALW 
destruction and control, including voluntary weapons hand-in or similar confidence and 
security-building measures, and a range of other areas on which there is much expeirence in 
other similar country contexts. These can usefully be linked to become important aspects of 
local peace-building initiatives or measures to reduce gender-based violence.  
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Human Security: Possible Synergies with Other Results Areas for 
Sweden’s new Strategy.  
We find that there are intrinsic overlaps and important potential synergies between the two 
other planned Results Areas proposed for Sweden’s next strategy for Mali - ‘natural 
resources, environment, climate and resilience’ and democratic governance, gender and 
human rights’, and the new ‘human security’ Results Area. 
 
We recommend that Sweden Enhances human security as an element of natural resource 
governance programmes.  A key aspect of enhancing natural resource governance in Mali is 
to support the development of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms in relation to natural 
resource tenure and use.  We therefore recommend that Sweden actively explores possibilities 
of supporting the wider development and equitable use of peaceful dispute settlement systems 
in localities and regions in Mali where it also has supported (or plans to support) natural 
resource governance and sustainable use. 
 
We similarly recommend that Sweden considers supporting the development and operation of 
relatively customised dispute settlement and access to justice mechanisms for key issues 
relating to natural resource governance: such as land tenure, water use, boundary or 
inheritance disputes. Similarly, there are issues of particular concern to women in this 
context, whose property or inheritance rights are often particularly vulnerable. Mechanisms 
to address such problems could preferentially be developed, for wider access by all sectors of 
the community but in an area of special interest to women. 
 
One way of approaching this is to aim to co-locate Swedish support for the proposed human 
security programmes to enhance access to justice (as discussed above) with it natural resource 
governance programmes. An alternative approach would be to provide enhanced support for 
natural source governance programmes in Mali in ways that not only enhance and ensure their 
conflict sensitivity but also include specific support for local peace-building or dispute 
settlement mechanisms.  
 
Enhance human security as an element of Climate Change and Resilience programmes.  
Similar observations apply here. Programmes that Sweden chooses to support to enhance 
resilience against climate change could usefully include a substantial component to strengthen 
dispute settlement and confidence-building measures in the relevant communities.  
 
Synergies with Democratic Governance, gender and human rights results area 
We find that there are wide opportunities for synergies between this results area and human 
security – in many ways too wide to discuss at this stage with any specificity. For example, 
Sweden could more directly link its present prioritisation of  ‘issues relating to access by 
women and girls to power, security and opportunity’ with human security porgramme areas 
discussed above, including promoting UNSC 1325 implementation; inclusive local peace-
building initiatives; access to justice for vulnerable sector of the community, community 
safety and security programmes, and violence (including GBV) reduction programmes.  
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Similarly, any Swedish supported programmes to extend and stregthen democratic 
governance at regional or district level could link importantly with the local peace-building 
initiatives discussed above in relation to Human Security.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
